The Problem of Subjectivity
Thomas Nagel, in his seminal essay “What is it like to be a bat?” (1974), framed consciousness as the subjective, first-person experience of being. For Nagel, the essence of consciousness lies in what it feels like to exist as a particular entity. A bat navigating the world through echolocation perceives reality in a way that humans cannot comprehend. This notion underscores a fundamental challenge in the study of consciousness: how to reconcile subjective experience with objective science.
Qualia — the individual, ineffable qualities of experience—exemplify this problem. The “redness” of red, the bitterness of coffee, or the pain of a headache are all deeply personal phenomena that resist reduction to physical processes. While neuroscience can map the brain regions associated with these experiences, it cannot fully explain why or how they feel the way they do
This divide, often referred to as the “hard problem of consciousness,” was articulated by philosopher David Chalmers. Unlike the “easy problems” of explaining how the brain processes information or generates behavior, the hard problem addresses why subjective experience arises at all. This distinction continues to frame much of the debate in contemporary consciousness studies.